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Abstract
AI researchers employ not only the scientific
method, but also methodology from mathematics
and engineering. However, the use of the scientific
method – specifically hypothesis testing – in AI is
typically conducted in service of engineering ob-
jectives. Growing interest in topics such as fairness
and algorithmic bias show that engineering-focused
questions only comprise a subset of the important
questions about AI systems. This results in the AI
Knowledge Gap: the number of unique AI systems
grows faster than the number of studies that char-
acterize these systems’ behavior. To close this gap,
we argue that the study of AI could benefit from
the greater inclusion of researchers who are well
positioned to formulate and test hypotheses about
the behavior of AI systems. We examine the barri-
ers preventing social and behavioral scientists from
conducting such studies. Our diagnosis suggests
that accelerating the scientific study of AI systems
requires new incentives for academia and industry,
mediated by new tools and institutions. To address
these needs, we propose a two-sided marketplace
called TuringBox. On one side, AI contributors
upload existing and novel algorithms to be studied
scientifically by others. On the other side, AI exam-
iners develop and post machine intelligence tasks
designed to evaluate and characterize algorithmic
behavior. We discuss this market’s potential to de-
mocratize the scientific study of AI behavior, and
thus narrow the AI Knowledge Gap.
1 The Many Facets of AI Research
Although AI is a sub-discipline of computer science, AI re-
searchers do not exclusively use the scientific method in their
work. For example, the methods used by early AI researchers
often drew from logic, a subfield of mathematics, and are dis-
tinct from the scientific method we think of today. Indeed AI
has adopted many techniques and approaches over time. In
this section, we distinguish and explore the history of these
∗Equal contribution.
methodologies with a particular emphasis on characterizing
the evolving science of AI.
1.1 AI as Math
As early as the seventeenth century, the notion that intelli-
gence could be equated to symbolic information processing
was formalized. In his 1677 Preface to the General Science
Leibniz wrote: “It is obvious that if we could find charac-
ters or signs suited for expressing all our thoughts as clearly
and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometry
expresses lines, we could do in all matters insofar as they
are subject to reasoning all that we can do in arithmetic and
geometry. For all investigations which depend on reasoning
would be carried out by transposing these characters and by a
species of calculus.” [Leibniz, 1685]
In the early 20th century, Leibniz’s ideas influenced a num-
ber of mathematicians. Logician and mathematician David
Hilbert posed the famous question: Can all of mathemati-
cal reasoning be formalized [Hilbert, 1928]? This question
spurred many others to explore the limits of computation and
logic, an enterprise that culminated in Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorems, which revealed fundamental limits of formal
reasoning.
But these discoveries of formal limitations around com-
putability and formal reasoning did not stop scholars from
pursuing the foundations of mechanized intelligence. AI,
as its known today, began with Alan Turing’s seminal work
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence” in which Turing
discussed the idea of creating machines that can think [Tur-
ing, 1950]. Turing acknowledged the vagueness of the terms
‘machine’ and ‘thought,’ and operationalized the question
with the Universal Turing Machine, which could perform ar-
bitrary symbolic computation. The idea, again, was that once
mathematics is mechanized, all manner of reasoning subse-
quently follows.
Thus, the early builders of AI systems were mainly math-
ematicians, devising mechanistic procedures–often called
proof theories–for all manner of reasoning. In 1955, Her-
bert Simon and Allen Newell’s Logic Theorist proved 38 the-
orems in the Principia Mathematica [Newell et al., 1959].
This led Simon to claim that they had “solved the mind-body
problem.” He argued that with a sufficiently powerful ver-
sion of the Logic Theorist, we could automate mathematical
reasoning, which in turn would enable the automation of all
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reasoning.
In subsequent decades, theoretical developments in sym-
bolic reasoning continued. This manifested in numerous
mathematical investigations, from analyzing the computa-
tional complexity of various symbolic reasoning problems,
to providing precise mathematical semantics of logic pro-
gramming languages [Van Emden and Kowalski, 1976], to
new forms of computationally efficient symbolic reasoning
on constrained languages [McCarthy, 1981; Jaffar and Maher,
1994; Kakas et al., 1992]. In tandem, significant theoretical
developments took place in machine learning, grounded in
statistical learning theory. These efforts resulted in rigorous
foundations for reasoning about facts [Pearl, 1986], learning
patterns [Vapnik, 1999] and taking actions and planning in
the presence of uncertainty [Sutton and Barto, 1998] .
1.2 AI as Engineering
Since the 1970s, in parallel to these developments in AI the-
ory, a growing cadre of AI engineers started taking shape.
On one hand, some mathematically-minded computer scien-
tists produced demonstrations of the capabilities of particu-
lar symbolic reasoning techniques. For example, one can
show how an AI agent performs planning by solving logi-
cal satisfiability problems [Kautz et al., 1992] or performs
various commonsense reasoning tasks using circumscription-
based logical reasoning [McCarthy, 1986].
On the other hand, AI engineers embarked on formalizing
all manner of domain-specific facts in symbols and rules that
can be used in operational expert systems [Jackson, 1998].
There were ambitious – but ultimately unsuccessful – at-
tempts to build expert systems manually with encyclopedic
knowledge, capable of answering any question [Lenat et al.,
1985]. The difficulty of curating such knowledge bases made
salient that building general AI systems was not only a chal-
lenge from a computational perspective, but also required an
infeasible knowledge engineering effort.
Despite two ‘AI Winters,’ the engineering methodologies
employed by builders of AI systems became increasingly so-
phisticated, leveraging contemporaneous increases in compu-
tation capacities and data streams. This sophistication took
the form of i) better developed methodologies, and ii) more
standardized and precise benchmarks.
First, AI engineers developed standardized knowledge en-
gineering methodologies for AI systems, such as KADS
[Wielinga et al., 1992]. This development also benefited from
the overall maturity in the broader field of software engineer-
ing, enabling standardized Application Programming Inter-
faces, team management, code documentation and sharing,
and so on.
Second, AI engineers have developed increasingly sophis-
ticated benchmark problems to compare their systems. These
benchmarks have taken three forms: as standardized tasks,
datasets, or metrics. In the early days of symbolic AI, these
benchmarks were qualitative, such as the ‘Blocks World’
[Sussman and Winograd, 1970; Bylander, 1994]. But modern
AI grounded in statistical theory has invited more sophisti-
cated benchmark tasks, from board games like Chess [Camp-
bell et al., 2002] and Checkers [Schaeffer et al., 2007], to card
games like Poker [Bowling et al., 2015], to computer games
like Atari [Mnih et al., 2015], to artificial markets for testing
trading algorithms [Wellman et al., 2001], to Robocup Soccer
[Kitano et al., 1997].
In problems spanning across application domains such as
computer vision and natural language processing (two of the
most prominent application areas of modern AI techniques),
the benchmark for performance on tasks has been set by
widely used, standardized, large-scale evaluation datasets.
For instance, in the task of object recognition, the Ima-
geNet [Russakovsky et al., 2015] dataset has become a ubiq-
uitous standard for performance. Similarly, for the tasks
of image captioning and scene understanding, the Microsoft
Common Objects in Context (MS-COCO) [Lin et al., 2014]
dataset has been instrumental in providing a reliable bench-
mark for performance.
The development of such large-scale benchmark problems
has led to the construction and widespread adoption of met-
rics to assess the performance of new algorithms at scale. En-
hancements of traditional signal processing metrics such as
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) [Davis and Goad-
rich, 2006] including precision, recall, and F1 measures have
been established as standard metrics for performance assess-
ment. In more involved tasks, metrics such as mean Average
Precision [Van De Sande et al., 2010](for object detection),
BLEU [Papineni et al., 2002] (for machine translation), and
Inception Score [Zhou et al., 2017] (for generative model-
ing assessment) are some examples that have been established
by the research community to evaluate complex intelligence
tasks.
1.3 AI as Science
In addition to these mathematical and engineering-based
methodologies, AI researchers also frequently employ the
scientific method – specifically the hypothesis testing
paradigm. For instance, to evaluate the performance of
reinforcement learning algorithms in a multi-agent setting
[Littman, 1994], it is common to resort to Monte Carlo sim-
ulation to estimate average properties such as convergence
rate and long-run performance. Likewise, in many complex
AI systems, the performance of the system under different
choices of parameters is often compared using the null hy-
pothesis testing paradigm[Cohen, 1995].
However, while some AI researchers have indeed em-
ployed a hypothesis driven approach in studying AI systems,
the predominant objective has been engineering-oriented: fo-
cused on designing and building intelligent systems. These
pertain, for example, to the performance of a heuristic plan-
ning system against some theoretical optimum, the speed of
convergence of a real-time optimization algorithm, or the
classification accuracy of a given image classification system.
Indeed, it is common for articles submitted to AI confer-
ences to be rejected if they do not present a specific tech-
nical advance beyond existing AI algorithms and models.
This observation has an important implication. Even when
AI researchers use the scientific method to examine the sys-
tems they build, the engineering-oriented incentives of the
larger community lead them to selectively target engineering-
oriented research questions.
While these are important scientific questions about AI
Study Stimulus Treatment Groups AI System Scope Behavior
Sweeney et al., 2013 Names as Search Terms Racial Association
Google Search
Engine Via API
Disparate
Treatment
Buolamwini et al., 2018
Parliamentarian
Headshots
Gender, Fitzpatrick
Skin Type Class
Facial Recognition
Algorithms Via API
Disparate
Mistreatment
Hannak et al., 2014 Consumer Profiles
Web Broswer, Operating
System, User History
Online Pricing
Algorithms Field
Disparate
Treatment
Table 1: Sample of existing behavioral studies of AI in terms of their stimulus, AI system, and measured behavior. We describe the treatment
types for each stimuli and the level at which the study occurs (either locally, via an API, or “in the field”).
systems, they are not the only important questions. As we
will discuss in the next section, there is a growing set of re-
search questions of interest to a broad range of scientists out-
side of the scope of the AI canon that involve concepts and
methods beyond the training of a typical AI researcher.
2 A New Science of AI
Recent advances in hardware and deep learning have led to
the proliferation of deployed AI systems. AI is no longer
confined to the laboratory but instead has become a ubiq-
uitous part of the social world. We rely on AI systems to
help us make decisions as simple as what movie to watch
next or where to go to dinner as well as more complex, high-
stakes decisions, such as who is able to get a loan or when an
inmate’s sentence should be reduced [Bennett and Lanning,
2007; Kaggle, 2013; Tay and Ho, 1992; Berk, 2012]. We
now share the roads with autonomous vehicles, we routinely
interact with social media bots, and financial markets are now
dominated by algorithmic trading [Bonnefon et al., 2016;
Ferrara et al., 2016].
Due to their ubiquity and potential harm, the increasingly
emergent and often unintended properties of these AI systems
have garnered widespread attention in both the public and
academic spheres [O’Neil, 2017; Friedman and Nissenbaum,
1996]. However, practices such as training on proprietary
data and using complex models often make it challenging to
use the underlying structure of the system to predict or study
its emergent behaviors [Voosen, 2017]. Instead many stud-
ies, especially in the area of algorithmic bias, have employed
techniques which do not require details about the system’s
architecture.
In 2013, Sweeney’s study on discrimination showed that
search results were disproportionately more likely to return
results related to arrest when a racially associated name was
used as a keyword in online advertisements [Sweeney, 2013].
This study and others like it began a new wave of hypothesis-
driven science related to AI systems.
Since then, an increasing number of studies has attempted
to characterize the emergent behaviors of high-stakes al-
gorithms. A recent study showed that dark, female faces
are misgendered at higher rates than lighter, male faces by
commercial facial recognition algorithms [Buolamwini and
Gebru, 2018]. ProPublica showed evidence of racial dis-
Figure 1: Conceptual illustration of applying the scientific method of
experimentation and causal inference to a black box AI system (cen-
ter) by providing a stimulus (left) and measuring behavioral output
(right).
crimination in new recidivism risk score algorithms as well
as price discrimination based on zip code for auto insur-
ance premiums [Larson et al., 2016; Larson et al., 2017].
Studies have even explored algorithmic bias on deployed
platforms. For example, recent studies have investigated
price discrimination on e-commerce sites [Chen et al., 2016;
Hannak et al., 2014].
Engineering tools such as multi-agent simulation and ROC
curves are not capable of fully explaining these systems and
their behavior. Instead, we turn to the domain specific knowl-
edge, tools, and methodologies of the social and behavioral
sciences.
2.1 Towards a social science methodology
We propose framing the output of AI systems as behavior,
with its own patterns and ecologies, and propose using sci-
entific techniques like experimentation and causal inference
to understand these behaviors, agnostic to the underlying sys-
tem architecture. Figure 1 illustrates this framing. Each of the
aforementioned studies in Section 2 contain three core com-
ponents: an AI system contained in a controlled environment,
systematic stimuli, and a measure of behavior, as shown in
Table 1.
At the core of the social sciences is the attempt to under-
stand and predict the behavior and emergent properties of
complex systems comprised of intelligent agents. Social sci-
entists could contribute several essential pieces of expertise to
questions that lie at the interface of AI and the social sciences.
First, social scientists possess knowledge on experimental de-
sign and causal inference. Designing stimuli for AI systems
is analogous to designing and administering more traditional
‘treatments’ in the social and behavioral sciences. Further,
in many cases such as investigating pricing discrimination on
e-commerce sites, the space of potential variables is infinite.
Social scientists conduct randomized controlled trials and de-
rive theoretically informed hypotheses to narrow the space of
their possible behavioral investigations. Second, social sci-
entists bring domain specific knowledge that a typical AI re-
searcher may not have, such as knowledge of specific types of
discrimination, human learning procedures, social dynamics,
among other relevant topics.
With the potential upsides to added collaboration with so-
cial and behavioral scientists in mind, we propose a new sci-
ence of AI which composites previous scientific AI method-
ologies, the domain expertise of the social sciences, and
social science methodologies such as causal inference and
hypothesis-driven research design.
2.2 The AI Knowledge Gap
But there are significant challenges facing this new science of
AI. These challenges primarily derive from incentives which
encourage the engineering of new systems over the study of
existing systems.
The first challenge relates to the reproducibility crisis, a
popular topic of discussion within the AI community. The
conversation about reproducibility centers around the follow-
ing problem: as researchers often desire to publish regu-
larly and rapidly, time constraints diminish their incentives
to reproduce results or replicate existing systems. The focus
on contributing novel systems can lead researchers to fail to
replicate their comparative benchmarks, to choose strategic
but non-comprehensive benchmarks, or to never publish the
code for their novel systems. Indeed it was recently found
that only 6% of 400 authors at two top AI conferences shared
their new algorithm’s code [Hutson, 2018].
The second challenge is the expertise required to study AI
systems in their social contexts. Many of the aforementioned
examples require knowledge in computer science as well as
knowledge (and data) related to the social domain of AI sys-
tems, such as the criminal justice system. However, for the
same reasons as with the challenge of reproducibility, there
are few incentives for the AI community to gain expertise de-
novo in every domain of interest, especially for increasingly
complex socio-technical systems. However, as mentioned
previously, social and behavioral scientists – due to their sci-
entific focus on the socio-technical systems themselves – are
uniquely positioned to help fill this gap.
The third challenge is accessibility. The pervasive use
of proprietary data and differences in computational power
can make it difficult for computer scientists to access rele-
vant models. Additionally, while social scientists have unique
training in measuring behavior and social outcomes, they do
not necessarily have the training required to install an exper-
Figure 2: Proxy evidence for an AI Knowledge Gap: the number of
AI agents built grows faster than the studies that characterize those
agents’ behavior.
imental AI system from Github or to invoke a corporate API
directly.
These dynamics have caused the study of existing AI sys-
tems to severely lag behind the production of new systems,
as shown in Figure 2. To estimate the pace of algorithm de-
velopment in machine learning and artificial intelligence, we
study the full set of 7,241 conference papers from the Neu-
ral Information Processing Systems (NIPS) Conference from
1987 to 2017. To count the number of papers introducing new
computational models, we search through abstracts and count
the number of papers that contain any of the words ‘new’,
‘novel’, ‘we propose’, and ‘we introduce’ in their abstract.
To count the papers aimed solely at studying previous mod-
els, we count the number of papers that include any of the
terms ‘we study’, ‘we examine’, ‘we compare’ and ‘we ana-
lyze’ in their abstract, but none of the keywords used to count
new models.
As discussed above, the key bottleneck in the study of the
behavior of AI systems is a misalignment of incentives. To
address these concerns, we propose TuringBox, a market plat-
form that provides access to and incentive for the study of AI
behavior.
3 TuringBox: A Market for the Behavioral
Research of AI Systems
In order to address the above challenges of accessibility, repli-
cation, and incentive incompatibility, a general tool for the
rigorous study of AI systems must satisfy many properties.
Drawing from the literature of existing platforms for AI re-
search, we enumerate these desirable properties below:
1. Customizable Metrics: The platform should allow for
the creation of custom evaluation metrics to evaluate AI
systems, and the customizable selection of subsets of
stimuli (data samples or environments). For instance,
users might wish to evaluate custom metrics of fairness,
precision, and accuracy on a variety of algorithms for a
particular task, or to evaluate algorithms on a variety of
subsets of stimuli.
2. Centralized Implementation: Scientists on the plat-
form should be able to evaluate the exact implementa-
tion on any arbitrary input sample, along with explic-
itly outlined hyperparameter settings that produced the
model. This property has been adopted by platforms
such as ParlAI [Miller et al., 2017] and Algorithmia.
3. Centralized Evaluation: The platform should unify
several different benchmarks that exist across commu-
nities in a centralized computing environment, with-
out replicating the benchmarks locally. Such an eval-
uation system has already been adopted by platforms
such as ParlAI [Miller et al., 2017], Algorithmia and
OpenML [Vanschoren et al., 2014].
4. General Compatibility: The platform should have a
consistent, generalizable method to include newer AI
problems and have support for all existing AI problems
of interest. This property is essential to understand the
behavior of classes of algorithms across different tasks
and environments, and provides a cohesive framework
for the study of AI behavior across different classes of
algorithms.
5. Full Scope: AI systems of interest can be accessed at
three different scopes. The first scope consists of algo-
rithms whose code is readily available and can be ac-
cessed directly from a scientist’s local machine or from
a centralized platform’s servers. The second scope in-
cludes algorithms that are accessible only from remote
servers via API calls. The third scope contains remotely
served algorithms that do not have an explicit API pro-
tocol, and thus must be observed “in the field,” via cus-
tom scripts, as exemplified in Hannak et al. A sufficient
platform for the behavioral study of AI should provide
functionality for each scope.
With these properties in mind, we envision a two-sided dig-
ital marketplace, called TuringBox, that couples two previ-
ously orthogonal threads of AI research by convening two
communities (see Fig 3). On one side of the market, AI con-
tributors upload existing and novel algorithms to both bench-
mark their algorithms with respect to performance, fairness,
or other qualities and to gain reputation in their community.
These contributors will be incentivized to upload not only al-
gorithms they wrote themselves, but also protocols that ac-
cess APIs and algorithms “in the field.”
On the other side of the market, AI examiners develop and
post tasks designed to examine and characterize algorithmic
behavior. We anticipate that this methodological tool will at-
tract not just computer scientists but will also be of interest
to experts in experimentation across the social and behavioral
sciences, thus mitigating the AI Knowledge Gap.
Notable examples of AI platforms include the DeepMind
PyschLab [Leibo et al., 2018], a fully 3D game-like platform
for agent-based AI research, ParlAI [Miller et al., 2017], a
unified framework for the evaluation of dialog models with
Figure 3: A schematic of the marketplace for AI.
additional support for images, CloudCV [Agrawal et al.,
2015], an open-source platform for machine learning and
computer vision, and OpenML [Vanschoren et al., 2014], an
online machine learning platform for sharing and organizing
data and machine learning algorithms. Each platform satis-
fies some of the properties listed above, and we map these
platforms to properties in Table 2.
3.1 Incentive Scheme
In our proposed market, both sides are driven by exogenous
and endogenous incentives rather than money. The imple-
mentation is engineered to best serve the unique interests of
both types of users. Below we discuss how each side of the
market incentivizes use by the other.
Incentives of examiners
As AI systems further permeate society, we envision in-
creasing demand for the examination of the behaviors of
these systems. The recent increase in studies on algorithmic
bias [Hajian et al., 2016] as well as the success of interdis-
ciplinary conferences such as Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency or the International Conference on Computa-
tional Social Science already suggest an interest from the so-
cial science community. In addition to understanding bias,
examiners may also be able to learn about the origins and
structure of complex human behavior, such as strategy for-
mation, as was the case with AlphaGo Zero [Silver et al.,
2016].
However, accessibility is a key concern preventing exam-
iners from studying existing systems. Many social scientists
have limited programming or computer science backgrounds
and cannot implement state of the art AI systems to study.
To address this concern, we employ the second side of the
market (the contributors) who upload their AI systems to the
platform. Examiners can then access these systems from a
central source without added expertise.
Incentives of the contributors
TuringBox motivates a large group of people – the contrib-
utors – to populate the platform with algorithms to study.
These contributors are AI researchers in academia and indus-
try as well as other individuals that possess the skills to design
and implement AI systems.
TuringBox will motivate contributors to upload their own
systems by addressing several concerns in the AI community.
Platform
Customizable
Metrics
Centralized
Implementation
Centralized
Evaluation
General
Compatibility
Full
Scope
Algorithmia
CloudCV
DeepMind PsychLab
FairML
OpenML
ParlAI
Themis-ML
TuringBox
Table 2: Platforms for the study of AI and their corresponding properties.
Importantly, the platform will assist with the problem of re-
producibility. When contributors upload their new systems,
all other contributors will then be able to access and test these
new systems. Having the designers of the algorithms them-
selves upload their algorithm is important for two reasons.
First, it prevents issues from arising due to differences in im-
plementations. Secondly, it ensures that the algorithm design-
ers have responsibility for the performance of the algorithm
and any subsequent aberrant behavior it may exhibit.
Further, TuringBox will ease access to benchmarking tools.
With so many AI systems on the platform, contributors will
be able to easily compare their system’s performance to the
performance of other state of the art systems. Moreover, by
incorporating social scientists on the examiner side of the
market, TuringBox will allow researchers to measure their
systems using new social metrics, such as fairness. As exam-
iners study an increasing number of AI systems, we anticipate
they will produce new ways to measure the biases or behav-
iors of AI systems, which contributors can then use to ensure
their systems operate as expected.
In addition to individual contributors, companies may also
be interested in filling the contributor side of the market via
APIs to demonstrate the performance of their proprietary al-
gorithms and that their algorithms are, for example, bias-free.
4 Discussion
Because of AI systems’ emergent complexity, their ubiquity
in society, and their inherent opacity, there is a need to map
the boundaries of AI research, and to extend them when pos-
sible. Our examination suggests there is untapped potential
for the hypothesis driven scientific investigation of AI sys-
tems. It is useful to think of AI systems not solely as engi-
neering artifacts, but rather as a new class of protocols with
heterogeneous behavior. In order to keep up with the prolif-
eration of these systems and to close the AI Knowledge Gap,
AI scientists must start to emphasize the generation of knowl-
edge about how these systems behave both in the lab and in
the field. This can be achieved by broadening the scope of
AI research and opening access to the study of AI behavior to
scientists from other disciplines.
We believe a market for the study of machine behavior is
crucial to reach these goals for several reasons. The first is
that it offers a general yet unified framework for understand-
ing when bias occurs in complex architectures. Many stud-
ies across computer science, behavioral economics, and legal
studies have already investigated the behavior of AI systems
but each uses an ad hoc approach to collecting data and mea-
suring behavior. Our market provides a toolkit for examining
behavior across a population of AI systems, which enables
a scalable and flexible alternative to costly algorithmic au-
dits. As an increasing number of AI systems are deployed
every day, and their real world stakes increase, a consistent
methodology to perform these algorithmic audits at scale be-
comes imperative.
The second rationale for the TuringBox platform is that it
helps bridge the gap between computer scientists and social
scientists. Historically, computer scientists and roboticists
were the only ones concerned with the behavior of machines,
because they were the only ones interacting with the systems.
However, social sciences offer many key skills, methods, and
perspectives about AI systems that are not being fully lever-
aged in the AI research community.
Finally, this framing can potentially curb adversarial ef-
fects of emergent superintelligences by providing a controlled
environment to examine their behaviors [Bostrom, 1998]. In-
deed this market anticipates a future where the AI systems
that inhabit it exhibit the complex, cross-domain behaviors of
artificial general intelligence.
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk created a revolution for the so-
cial sciences by scaling the way social scientists perform ex-
periments [Buhrmester et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2011]. For
the first time, scientists could cheaply run massive online ex-
periments and learn about individual and collective behavior
without recruiting subjects to a physical location. By low-
ering the barrier to entry for experimentation, the market was
successful in both opening up new methodologies and democ-
ratizing research to a broad class of scientists. As a behavioral
science of AI systems becomes conceivable, we believe the
next revolution in AI experimentation will come from stan-
dardizing experimental protocols while keeping the hetero-
geneity of these systems wide open.
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